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The Value o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  i n  
S t r i c t l y  C o m p e t i t i v e  S i t u a t i o n s  * 
J e a n - P i e r r e  ~ o n s s a r d *   
A b s t r a c t  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  a game t h e o r e t i c  model i s  used  t o  
e x t e n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  v a l u e  t h e o r y ,  as deve loped  i n  
d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s ,  t o  c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s .  One o f  
t h e  main d i f f e r e n c e s  between c o m p e t i t i v e  and non- 
c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s  i s  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  envi ronment  
(namely t h e  c o m p e t i t o r s )  may b e  m o d i f i e d  as a r e s u l t  
o f  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  i n  a n o t h e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  envir!)nment 
( n a t u r e ) .  Hence, s t a t e s  o f  t h e  wor ld  and a c t i o n s  qay 
no more b e  i n d e p e n d e n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  we s h a l l  show 
how t h e  c l a s s i c a l  concep t  may b e  g e n e r a l i z e d  t o  c o v e r  
s t r i c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s .  
5 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The concep t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  one of  t h e  
c o r n e r s t o n e s  o f  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  [3, 71.  It i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  
be  a g u i d e  f o r  t h e  r e s e a r c h  and development  o f  new s t r a t e g i e s ;  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  f o r  s t r a t e g i e s  which would a l l o w  f o r  t h e  
g a t h e r i n g  o f  new i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  r e a l  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .  
However, i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  s t r a t e g i e s  may i n d u c e  
a change  i n  t h e  b e h a v i o r  of  t h e  c o m p e t i t o r s  i f  t h e s e  become 
aware  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n .  Then i n f o r m a t i o n  usage  i s  
* 
T h i s  p a p e r  was p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  "Seminar  i n  d e c i s i o n  
Theory ,"  B e a u l i e u ,  F r a n c e ,  December 1973,  which was sponso red  
by t h e  C e n t r e  d lEnse ignemen t  S u p g r i e u r  du Management P u b l i c ,  
94112,  A r c u e i l ,  F r a n c e .  It w i l l  be  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  
p r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e .  
* * 
On l e a v e  from t h e  C e n t r e  d lEnse ignemen t  S u p e r i e u r  du  
Management P u b l i c ,  94112,  A r c u e i l ,  and  Groupe d e  Recherche  e n  
G e s t i o n  d e s  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  E c o l e  P o l y t e c h n i q u e ,  75005, P a r i s ,  
F r a n c e ;  r e s e a r c h  s c h o l a r  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
App l i ed  Systems A n a l y s i s ,  Laxenburg,  A u s t r i a .  
The a u t h o r  would l i k e  t o  e x p r e s s  h i s  t h a n k s  t o  Rober t  
Winkler  f o r  e x t e n s i v e  d i s c u s s i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t .  
l i k e l y  t o  become more c o m p l i c a t e d  s i n c e  a  s t r a t e g y  used  by 
t h e  i n fo rmed  c o m p e t i t o r  may b e  u sed  as a  " second  s t a g e "  
e x p e r i m e n t  o n  n a t u r e  by t h e  un informed c o m p e t i t o r s .  So ,  
f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker who i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  v a l u e  of  a n  
e x p e r i m e n t  which i m p l i e s  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  b e h a v i o r  as 
p e r c e i v e d  by c o m p e t i t o r s ,  s t r a t e g i e s  and s t a t e s  o f  n a t u r e  
(wh ich  i n c l u d e  t h e  c o m p e t i t o r s '  s t r a t e g i e s ) ,  may no l o n g e r  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a s  u s u a l l y  assumed i n  d e c i s i o n  
t h e o r y .  
The p r e s e n t  p a p e r  a n a l y s e s  c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which 
i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o - n  i s  per formed w i t h  f u l l  knowledge o f  
t h e  c o m p e t i t o r s  though t h e  outcome i s  known o n l y  t o  t h e  e x p e r i -  
m e n t e r .  The a n a l y s i s  is  b a s e d  on a g e n e r a l  game t h e o r e t i c  
model d e v e l o p e d  by Harsanyi  1 .  S i n c e  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  r a t h e r  
c o n c e p t u a l , ,  i t  d e a l s  main ly  w i t h  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and  d i s c u s -  
s i o n s ,  r e l y i n g  on o t h e r  p a p e r s  f o r  b a s i c  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
p r o o f s  [4, 51.  
I n  s e c t i o n  2 we s h a l l  d e f i n e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  as used  i n  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s .  I n  s e c t i o n  3 we 
s h a l l  show how t h e  c o n c e p t  may b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  s t r i c t l y  
c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  i l l u s t r a t e d  by means 
o f  a n  example i n  s e c t i o n  4 .  
52  The Value o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  R e v i s i t e d  
C o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem u n d e r  
u n c e r t a i n t y :  s e l e c t  an a c t i o n  among a f i n i t e  s e t  o f  f e a s i b l e  
a c t i o n s  A = { a ) ,  g i v e n  a  f i n i t e  s e t  o f  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s  o r  
s t a t e s  of  n a t u r e ,  E  = { e l ,  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on t h e  
e  
e v e n t s  po = { p z l e E E ( p 0  > 0;  E pz = l ) ,  and a  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  
ecE 
u  ( o r  more g e n e r a l l y  a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n )  d e f i n e d  on A x E. 
(A and  E a r e  assumed f i n i t e  f o r  m a t h e m a t i c a l  s i m p l i c i t y ) .  
Accord ing  t o  d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y ,  t h e  s e l e c t e d  a c t i o n  s h o u l d  
maximize t h e  e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f .  Tak ing  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
e  e  
on E a s  a  p a r a m e t e r  PEP = { p  ( p  > 0, C pe = 1 1 ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  
~ E E  
e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f  ; ( p )  i s  t h e n  o b t a i n e d  as 
u ( p )  = Max C u ( a , e ) ~ ~  . 
aeA eeE 
L e t  a n  e x p e r i m e n t  1' be  d e f i n e d  a s  a random v a r i a b l e  o n  P .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y  assume t h a t  t h i s  random v a r i a b l e  may t a k e  o n l y  a  
f i n i t e  s e t  o f  v a l u e s  {p i l iEI  i n  P w i t h  r e s p e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
y i ( y i  > 0 ;  C yi = 1 ) .  F o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  we have  
i E I 
An expe r imen t  may e q u i v a l e n t l y  b e  d e f i n e d  by a m a t r i x  
= ' q e i ' e c ~ , i r ~  i n  which qei = Prob { i l e ) .  One may go from one  
d e f i n i t i o n  t o  t h e  o t h e r  one  by -means o f  Bayes t heo rem.  We s h a l l  
mos t ly  u s e  t h e  f i rs t  d e f i n i t i o n  ( f o r  a p r a c t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  example 1 . 4 . 3  i n  [ 7 ]  ; f o r  
f u r t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  s e e  [6] ) . 
The e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  be  r e v e a l e d  by 
t h e  expe r imen t  1°, EVI(p ( 1'1, i s  t h e n  d e f i n e d  as t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  
0 
g a i n  o b t a i n e d  by making o n e ' s  d e c i s i o n  depend c.3 t h e  outcome o f  
t h e  e x p e r i m e n t .  Namely . 
A s  a s p e c i a l  c a s e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  of  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
EVPI(po) ,  o b t a i n e d  by t h e  exper iment  which would r e v e a l  t h e  s t a t e  
o f  n a t u r e ,  i s  such  t h a t  ( w r i t i n g  pe f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  v e c t o r  
such  t h a t  pE = O f o r  a l l  k # e  and pz = 1) 
Tne e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  
as t h e  maximal amount a t  which one would be w i l l i n g  t o  buy t h e  
e x p e r i m e n t .  
I n  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we s h a l l  p r o v e  some s i m p l e  
p r o p e r t i e s  s u g g e s t e d  by ( 2 . 3 1 ,  ( s e e  [6] f o r  a  f u l l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s ) .  T h i s  w i l l ' a l s o  a l l o w  us t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  a p p a r a t u s  needed s u b s e q u e n t l y .  
Denote by PI t h e  s m a l l e s t  convex s u b s e t  o f  P  which c o n t a i n s  
t h e  v e c t o r s  {pi I i E I  and by Oav f ( p )  t h e  minimal concave  f u n c t i o n *  
g r e a t e r  o r  e q u a l  t o  f ( p )  on  PI, i n  which f ( p )  i s  any r e a l - v a l u e d  
* g ( p )  i s  a concave  f u n c t i o n  on  P  i f  and on ly  i f  f o r  a l l  pl and  p2 
n n A  9 1 1  Q r t n . 1 ) :  @ ( A D ,  + (1 - A )  P,) > Ag(p, )  + (1 - A )  g ( p , ) .  
cont inuous  f u n c t i o n  on P. Let  Cav f ( p )  s t a n d  f o r  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  Cav f ( p )  a t  po. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 1 .  For  any experiment 1' and any p o ~ P I ,  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  EVI(po 1'1, s a t i s f i e e  
P r o o f .  The i n e q u a l i t y  f o l l o w s  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
Cav and from ( 2 . 2 )  and ( 2 . 3 ) .  I I 
C o r o l l a r y  2 . 2 .  I f  t h e  s e t  o f  v e c t o r s  {piIiEI a r e  l i n e a r i l y  
independent  t h e n  ( 2 . 5 )  is  an e q u a l i t y .  
p r o o f .  ~ e t  A' = { A  = ( A ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ A ~  - > O  , n i = l  , I: xipi = p o l .  
is1 i s  I 
S i n c e  ; ( * I  i s  a  convex f u n c t i o n  on PI, i t s  c o n c a v i f i c a t i o n  may 
be  e x p r e s s e d  as 
But t h e  s e t  o f  v e c t o r s  a r e  l i n e a r i l y  independen t ,  hence 
A 0  c o n t a i n s  on ly  one point, namely y = {yi l i r I ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  on t h e  s e t  i p .  1 a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  exper iment  1'. 
1 i r I  
Th l ~ s  
T h i s  r e s u l t  h a s  a  s i m p l e  g e o m e t r i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
I n d e e d ,  assume t h a t  E  = { e  1 ' e p l  and l e t  ; ( = )  be  t h e  o p t i m a l  
1 2  2 p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  on P = { p  = ( p  , p  )1p1 2 0, P 1 0 ,  pi  + p2  = 11  
(i(.), a convex f u n c t i o n ,  is  p i e c e  wise  l i n e a r  s i n c e  t h e  s e t  o f  
a c t i o n s  A i s  f i n i t e ) .  Le t  po€P b e  t h e  a  p r i o r i  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  on E and t h e  expe r imen t  1' = t i  , j  be  d e f i n e d  by 
two p o s s i b l e  a  p o s t e r i o r i  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on E ,  
pi€P and p . & P ,  w i t h  m a r g i n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  yi and y  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
J j  
( r e c a l l  t h a t  f o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  we have yipi + y j p j  = p o ) .  Then t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  v a l u e  a n a l y s i s  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
g r a p h .  
Finally note a simple result as a direct specification of 
Corollary 2.2. 
Corollary 2.3. The value of perfect information may by 
expressed as, 
EVPI(P~) = Cav ;(p) - u(po) . 
P 
Since the function u(-) is convex it may -ppear that the 
technical apparatus developed so far is unduly complicated. 
However, as we shall now show, it will turn out to be particul- 
arily well suited for the study of competitive situations. 
53 S e q u e n t i a l  S t r i c t l y  Compe t i t i ve  S i t u a t i o n s  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  we s h a l l  g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  concep t  o f  t h e  
v a l u e  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  s i m p l e s t  form o f  c o m p e t i t i o n ;  t h a t  
i s ,  t h e  c o n s t a n t  sum c a s e .  
L e t  t h e  two c o m p e t i t o r s  b e  c o m p e t i t o r  1 and c o m p e t i t o r  2 ,  
1 s e l e c t i n g  a n  a c t i o n  f rom A ,  and 2  f rom B = { b ) .  Fo r  any e v e n t ,  
eeE,  we assume t h a t  t h e  two c o m p e t i t o r s '  p a y o f f s ,  which a r e  now 
d e f i n e d  on A x B x E, add  up t o  some c o n s t a n t  c ( e ) ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
o f  t h e  s e l e c t e d  a c t i o n s .  We assume t h a t  t h e  two c o m p e t i t o r s  move 
s e q u e n t i a l l y ,  1 moving f i r s t ;  t h a t  i s ,  1 s e l e c t s  some a c t i o n  a  
which i s  r e v e a l e d  t o  2 and t h e n  2 s e l e c t s  some a c t i o n  b ,  b o t h  
d e c i s i o n  makers b e i n g  u n c e r t a i n  a b o u t  t h e  e v e n t  e  which w i l l  
p r e v a i l  b u t  h a v i n g  t h e  same p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on  E. Then 
1 g e t s  u ( a , b , e )  and 2  g e t s  v ( a , b , e )  s u c h  t h a t  
N o t i c e  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c ( e ) ' s  may be d i f f e r e n t  s o  t h a t  
t h e  game i n  e x t e n s i v e  form i s  non-cons tan t ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  game i n  
normal form i s  c o n s t a n t  sum. Namely we have ,  i n  t e rms  o f  e x p e c t e d  
payof f  
(aeA) (beB) E { u ( a , b , e )  + v ( a , b , e ) l  pz = E. c ( e )  po e . 
eeE eeE 
I n  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  G ( P ~ ) ,  1's o p t i m a l  e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f  is 
; (po )  = Max Min I: pEu(a ,b , e )  , 
aeA beB eeE 
and 2's optimal expected payoff is 
e ;(Po) = Min Max I: pov(a,b,c) . 
acA beB eeE 
These optimal payoffs are derived under the usual assumption 
that both competitors behave rationally so that competitor 2 
maximizes his payoff conditional on the action selected by 
competitor 1 and competitor 1 'selects his own action accordingly. 
In this framework, what is the value of perfect information 
on E to competitor 1, assuming that the other one will know that 
perfect information has been bought? Competitor 2, by observing 
competitor 1's selected action, may learn something about the 
state of nature observed by 1. How does this learning procedure 
operate and what are its implications for information usage? 
These are the problems we now wish to investigate. 
This investigation relies on a theoretical result proved in 
[ 5 ,  theorem 1,page 1011. In the context of this paper the result 
appears as an extension of corollary 2.2, 
proposition 3.1. In a strictly competitive sequential situation 
.the value of perfect information to competitor 1 may be expressed 
as 
Insights provided by this result and their interpretations 
will be conveyed by means of an example. Let us however note 
immediately that in spite of the formal parallelism between 
(2.6) and (3.3), a significent difference lies in the fact 
that in (3.3) ; ( P )  need not be convex. The implications of 
this fact for information usage will clearly appear in the 
example. 
54 An Example 
4 . 1  The Case 
Suppose t h a t  1 and 2 ,  t h e  two c o m p e t i t o r s ,  have t o  s e t  a  
p r i c e ,  aEA f o r  1 and ~ E B  f o r  2 ,  f o r  a  new p r o d u c t .  Moreover,  
suppose  t h a t  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h c  marke t ,  ~ E E ,  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  Suppose 
a l s o  t h a t  1 i s  t h e  p r i c e  l e a d e r  s o  t h a t  2 w i l l  w a i t  u n t i l  1 h a s  
s e t  up h i s  p r i c e .  
Assume t h a t  t h e  payoff  t a b l e s  look  a s  f o l l o w s :  
I n  c a s e  o f  a  bad marke t ,  t h e  b e n e f i t s  would add up t o  6 
and,  depend ing  on t h e  p r i c e s  s e t  would b e  s h a r e d  s u c h  t h a t  
I n  c a s e  o f  a  good marke t ,  t h e  f i g u r e s  would add up t o  9 
and b e  such  t h a t :  
2 ' s  p r i c e  
low h i g h  
( 5 , l )  * ( 1 , 5 )  
( 3 , 3 )  ( 2 , 4 )  
Bad Market 
e = e l  
* ( 1 ' s  p a y o f f ,  2 ' s  p a y o f f )  
1 ' s  p r i c e  
low 
h igh  
- -  
2 ' s  p r i c e  
low h i a h  
( 5 , 4 )  ( 6 , 3 )  
( 4 , 5 )  ( 7 , 2 )  
. 
Good Market 
e = e 2  
1 ' s  p r i c e  
low 
h i g h  
'f e h e r e  *ere qo m c e r t a i n t i e s ,  t h e n  t h e  two compet i to r s  
would s e q u e n t i a l l y  s e t  a  h i g h  p r i c e  (HI i n  a bad market and a 
low p r i c e  (L) i n  a good market .  
If they a r e  u n c e r t a i n  abou t  t h e  market ,  t h e n  t h e  p r i c e s  
t o  be  s e t  w i l l  depend o n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o v e r  E. 
These opt imal  p r i c e s  and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  payoff  t o  1 a r e  
d e p i c t e d  on F i g u r e  2. 
PAYOFF I N  PAYOFF Ihl 
CASE OF CASE . OF 
BAD 
MARKE 1 MARKET 
7 7 
F i g u r e  2 .  1's optima; expected payoff 
E u ( p )  
6 
5 
4 "  
3 - -  
2 -- 
1 - -  
I_ -- . - 
* (1'8 p r i c e ,  2 ' 8  p r i c e )  
0 1 1 5  11 2 3 1 4  1 P 
-- 
I L . L ) *  1 
---- - -  5 
- 4  
I I I 
I I I I I 





a . 1  
PR0B.W 
BAD 
1 M A S R  T
O n e  - a n  see that if t h e  probability of a bad market : s  less 
than 11.2 competitor 1 should set a low pri e and if i t  is 
greater than 1/2 he should set a high price. Competitor 2 
would follow competitor 1's price if the probability of a bad 
market is less than 1/5 or greater than 3 / 4  ;between these two 
values competitor 2 would set the opposite price of competitor 1. 
Intuitively if the uncertainties are high competitor 2 has much 
mo1.e to gain by taking a bold risk than by being a follower (for 
instance suppose 1 sets a low price in the expectation of a good 
market, by setting a high price 2 may loose 1 unit if I t s  
expectation turns out to be right but he wins 4 units if 1's 
expectation turns out to be wrong). We shall concentrate our 
3 analysis in the case of high uncertainites (I < p 5 5 - 
Suppose now that competitor 1 may order a market study and 
thus obtain perfect information (competitor 2 would know that 
competitor 1 ordered a market study though he would not know the 
result). What would be the value of this market study? Intuitiv- 
ely again, if competitor 2 knows that competitor 1 knows the size 
of the market, he should be far less willing to take a bold risk 
and may very well fall back on a follower attitude. But this is 
not so simple since,if competitor 1 could expect a follower 
attitude,he could exploit competitor 2's belief by reversing 
his choices (set a high price in a good market, and get 7 units, 
and a low price in a bad market, and get 5 units). Now, if 
competitor 2 could expect that competitor 1 expects a follower 
attitude he could exploit competitor 1's belief ............... 
Clearly, the inconsistency in this succession of expectations 
may o n l y  b e  r e s o l v e d  u s i n g  r a n d o m i z a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  conf i rmed  
by t h e  game t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  which we s h a l l  now p r e s e n t  
and i n t e r p r e t .  
4.2  The Value o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  t o  C o m p e t i t o r . 1  and How 
t o  Get It 
Assume t h a t  p  = 1 / 2 ,  t h e n  from a  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a n d p o i n t  
we know t h a t ,  
EVPI(1 /2)  7 Cav u ( p )  - G ( 1 / 2 )  
I n  o r d e r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h i s  we s h a l l  i n t r o d u c e  a n  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
s t e p .  Assume t h a t  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
c o m p e t i t o r  1 b u t  t h a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  expe r imen t  i s  a v a i l a b l e :  
1' = {i, j} such  t h a t  pi = 1 / 5  and p j  = 3 /4  w i t h  r e s p e c t i v e  
m a r g i n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  yi = 5/11  and y = 6/11 .  Moreover, assume j 
t h a t  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  expe r imen t  w i l l  be  made p u b l i c  t o  b o t h  
c o m p e t i t o r s .  Note t h a t  a t  t h e  p o i n t s  pi and p  c o m p e t i t o r  2 j '  
i s  p r e c i s e l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  between s e t t i n g  a h i g h  o r  a  low p r i c e .  
Anyhow t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  p u b l i c  expe r imen t  t o  c o m p e t i t o r  1 i s  
If c o m p e t i t o r  1 c o u l d  p r i v a t e l y  buy t h e  expe r imen t  1°, h e  
a lways  h a s  t h e  o p t i o n  t o  make t h e  outcome p u b l i c  s o  t h a t  
Can he  do b e t t e r ?  
If c o m p e t i t o r  1 does n o t  make t h e  outcome p u b l i c ,  
compe t i to r  2 i s  no l o n g e r  i n d i f f e r e n t  between which p r i c e  
t o  s e t  b u t  shou ld  s e t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  p r i c e  o f  c o m p e t i t o r  1. 
Such a n  a t t i t u d e  cannot  b e  e x p l o i t e d  s i n c e , i f  c o m p e t i t o r  1 
decided t o  s w i t c h  his p r i c e s  ( s e t  a  h i g h  p r i c e  i n  c a s e  o f  
Pi = 1 / 5 ,  and a  low p r i c e  i n  c a s e  o f  p  = 3 / 4 ) , h e  would j 
h imse l f  be  worse o f f  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e  he  would o b t a i n  
i n s t e a d  o f  
by changing from a  low t o  a  h igh  p r i c e  i n  c a s e  of  pi = 1 / 5 ) .  
C o n s e ~ u e n t l y  whether  o r  no t  c o m p e t i t o r  1 makes t h e  outcome 
p u b l i c  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  ( i t  o n l y  makes c o m p e t i t o r  2 ' s  problem 
somewhat s i m p l e r )  and s o  
S u p r i s i n g l y  enough, a c c o r d i n g  t o  o u r  t h e o r y ,  
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  va lue  of  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  
c o m p e t i t o r  1 i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  v a l u e  o f  i m p e r f e c t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  b o t h  c o m p e t i t o r s .  T h i s  i s  e x p l a i n e d  as 
f o l l o w s .  What would be t h e  p u b l i c  v a l u e  o f  p e r f e c t  
1 - i n f o r m a t i o n ?  C l e a r l y  t h i s  would b e  f E(o)  + 7 u ( l )  - u ( 1 / 2 ) ,  
which is s e e n  t o  b e  s m a l l e r  t h a n  ~ ~ 1 ( 1 / 2 1  1'). So i f  
c o m p e t i t o r  1 g e t s  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e n  h e  i s  no l o n g e r  
i n d i f f e r e n t  between making t h e  outcome p u b l i c  o r  n o t .  
I n t u i t i v e l y  he knows t c ~  much t o  make it p u b l i c !  
T h e o r e t i c a l l y  l-.e s h o u l d  d e l e t e  h i s  s u r p l u s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
by p u t t i n g  h i m s e l f  back  i n t o  p a r t i a l  i g n o r a n c e .  If h e  
l e a r n s  t h a t  t h e  market i s  bad ,  he  s h o u l d  c l a i m  t 5 a t  i t  is  
on ly  bad  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  3/4  and,  i f  he l e a r n s  t h a t  i t  is 
good, h e  s h o u l d  c l a i m  t h a t  i t  i s  good on ly  w i t h  ~ r o b a b i l i t ~  
4 / 5 .  If c o m p e t i t o r  1 canno t  make h i s  c l a i m s  b e l i e v e d  t h e n  
t h e  o n l y  o p p o r t u n i t y  which remains  i s  t o  randomize h i s  c h o i c e s  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  : 
p r i c e  good market  bad market  
2 / 1 1  
Then c o m p e t i t o r  2 w i l l  u s e  t h e  p r i c e  s e t  by c o m p e t i t o r  1 
a s  a n  i m p e r f e c t  exper iment  on t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  marke t .  Us ing  
Bayes ' r u l e  h e  may, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  d e r i v e  tha t  
8 1 
- . -  
Prob (good market ( 1's price is low) = 11 2 - 4 - - g 1 t z  5 '  
,1 2 11 
which, of course, is precisely what competitor 1 claimed 
when he set a low price. Since competitor 1 may theoretically 
get rid of his surplus of information using a randomized choice, 
it is clear (and it is also intuitive) that 
It remains to be seen that he cannot do better. Again competitor 
2 has a strategy, involving randomization, which c%?r~ot be 
exploited. It is-given by the following table: 
The effect of this strategy is to make competitor 1 indifferent 




between which price to set whatever the market is (for instance 
if the market is good, competitor 1's expectations are 
in case of low price, and 
Competitor 2 







s t r a t e g y  f o r  c o m p e t i t o r  2 ,  s i n c e  i t  o p t i m i z e s  h i s  e x p e c t e d  
p a y o f f  c o n d i t i o n a l  on  c o m p e t i t o r  1 's  p r i c e ,  b u t  i t  i s  a 
r e i n f o r c e m e n t  f o r  c o m p e t i t o r  1's  own r a n d o m i z a t i o n .  I n  terms 
o f  e x p e c t e d  payof f  we f i n a l l y  o b t a i n  
I f  we n o t e  t h a t  t h e  expe r imen t  1' i s  i n d e e d  t h e  expe r imen t  
whose p u b l i c  v a l u e  i s  t h e  h i g h e s t  f o r  c o m p e t i t o r  1 , t h i s  g i v e s  
a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  P r o p o s i t i o n  3 .1 .  



